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COMMENT
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT IN THE GULF OF MEXICO:
IMPACT OF THE TUNA EXCEPTION TO THE
FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976
From January to May Japanese fishermen enter the Gulf of
Mexico in search of tuna. These tuna are highly migratory fishes'
which follow a loop current that funnels warm Caribbean waters
through the Gulf during the winter months.' Called "longliners"
because of the type of fishing gear they employ,' these 100 to 300
ton Japanese ships remain at sea for as long as six months, process-
ing and freezing their catch before returning home.'
The presence of the longliners in the Gulf presents a two-fold
problem. First, concern exists for the continued viability of the tuna
fishery itself, particularly a concern for the future of the giant
bluefin tuna.5 Second, the tuna boats take large numbers of highly
prized billfish, depleting a valuable stock that would be otherwise
1. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(14) (1976) provides: "The term 'highly migratory species'
means species of tuna which, in the course of their life cycle, spawn and migrate over
great distances in waters of the ocean." See H. JONES, FISH MIGRATION 17 (1968).
2. See W. Fox, TEMPORAL-SPATIAL RELATIONSHIPS AMONG TUNAS AND BILLFISHES
BASED ON THE JAPANESE LONGLINE FISHERY IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN, 1956-1965 (Univer-
sity of Miami Sea Grant Program, Sea Grant Technical Bulletin No. 12, 1971). The
tunas are largely cosmopolitan, found in all of the warmer oceans. Their distribution is
influenced by environmental characteristics, and the primary motivating factor for
seasonal distribution is water temperature. The tunas of commercial importance are
found in waters ranging from 180C to 230C, which explains their migration with the
ocean currents.
3. A. FRIDMAN, THEORY AND DESIGN OF COMMERCIAL FISHING GEAR 431-33 (1973).
The "longline" is a line that is supported by evenly spaced glass or plastic floats, usually
90-100 kilometers in length, but sometimes as long as 130 kilometers. Between the
floats, four to six baited hooks dangle to depths of up to 150 meters. Id. See Bullis,
Preliminary Report on Exploratory Longline Fishing for Tuna in the Gulf of Mexico
and the Caribbean Sea, 17 CoM. FISHERIES REV. No. 10 at 1 (1955); Lopez, McClellan,
Bertolino & Lange, The Japanese Longline Fishery in the Gulf of Mexico, 1978, 41
MARINE FISHERIES REV. No. 10 at 23 (1979); Shapiro, The Japanese Long-line Fishery
for Tunas, 12 CoM. FISHERIES REV. No. 4 at 1 (1950).
4. FISH POPULATION DYNAMICS 309 (J. Gulland ed. 1977). The commercially
valuable catch comprises primarily six members of the family Scombridae: the
yellowfin, albacore, bigeye, bluefin, skipjack, and southern bluefin tunas. These six
scombroids comprise 75 percent of the world catch. Id.
5. 50 C.F.R. § 285.26, table 1 (1980). So-called "giants" are those bluefins in ex-
cess of 310 pounds. Other classifications are medium bluefins (135-310 lbs.), school
bluefins (14-135 lbs.), and young schocl bluefins (less than 14 lbs.). Id. See also Weld,
Update: Bluefin Tuna, 42 SALTWATER SPORTSMAN No. 5 at 70 (1981).
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available exclusively for recreational purposes.' Billfishes7 frequent
the same blue water areas as the tunas, and their feeding habits
make them easy prey for the non-selective gear of the longline.'
With the enactment in 1976 of the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act (FCMA), Congress extended the exclusive fishery
management authority of the United States to 200 nautical miles
from the coastline." However, this management authority excluded
highly migratory species of fishes, including tuna." Pursuant to this
exception, the Japanese follow the tuna schools into the Gulf of Mex-
ico. Because the tuna exception lies at the cutting edge of critical
fisheries management problems in the Gulf and elsewhere, the legal
regime under which the longliners operate, and the political back-
ground and international milieu that brought about both the passage
of the FCMA and its attendant exception to the management of,
highly migratory species of fish, must be understood.
The Fishery Management System: Beginnings
The traditional international legal regime applicable to the
harvesting of fishery resources was the concept of "res nullius."'"
6. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(3) (1976): The recreational fishery is a recognized major
source of employment and contributes significantly to the economy of the nation. Some
groups assert that this substantial economic bloc stands to be damaged considerably
by Japanese depletion of the billfish stock. See note 129, infra. Maumus F. Claverie,
Jr., New Orleans, La., attorney and member of the New Orleans Big Game Fishing
Club, asserted that one longliner operating in an area for one week will ruin that area
for sport billfishing for the rest of the season. According to Mr. Claverie, based on the
observations of the New Orleans club, in certain areas the longliner catch has been 90
percent billfish and 10 percent tuna. Interview with Maumus F. Claverie, Jr. (June 2,
1981).
7. Billfishes are members of the family Istiophoridae, including white, blue, and
black marlin, sailfishes, swordfishes and spearfishes.
8. W. Fox, supra note 2, at 4. The longline is retrieved from a boat moving at ap-
proximately four knots, and most bilifishes are caught when the line is being retrieved
and is near the surface. According to Fox, the distributional overlap is very high
among tunas and billfishes, id. at 45, and although joint occurrences between scom-
broids and istiophorids will show variances when compared species to species, most
tunas and billfishes may be caught together. Id. at 15. White marlin and yellowfin tuna
have a high distributional overlap and both are abundant in the Gulf of Mexico;
therefore, the incidental bycatch of white marlin is quite high. Id. See note 6, supra.
9. Act of April 13, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§
180 et seq. (1976)).
10. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1811, 1812 (1976).
11. Id. § 1813 (1976).
12. See F. CHRISTY & A. SCOTT, THE COMMON WEALTH IN OCEAN FISHERIES 154-56,
177-82 (1965). Underlying the notion of "res nullius" (meaning "belonging to no one")
was an assumption that ocean resources were inexhaustible. Id. at 155. Such a notion
simply is not true, especially as more efficient catch methods are developed and cer-
tain fishery resources become dangerously depleted. See 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(3) (1976).
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Fish in the high seas were considered to belong to no one while free-
swimming, but belonged to those who captured them when reduced
to possession.3 As competition for fishery resources increased and
nations began to feel the economic pinch of a potentially reduced
catch, a belief arose in the international community that a nation
was justified in asserting management authority over a fishery re-
source vital to that nation's well-being."
Shortly before World War II, the rich Alaskan salmon fishery
began to feel the effect of Japanese fishing boats which took the
salmon as they ran on the high seas. In response to a fear that the
Japanese would return following the war, and in response to the dis-
covery of petroleum reserves off the Gulf coast, President Truman
issued two proclamations in September 1945."e The first asserted
United States claims to the natural resources of the continental
shelf contiguous with the nation's coastline," and the second
asserted the right of the United States to establish fishery conserva-
tion zones under certain prescribed circumstances."
The fishery proclamation did not establish any fishery conserva-
tion zones and, in fact, denied the right of the United States to do so
13. G. KNIGHT, MANAGING THE SEA'S RESOURCES 24 (1977).
14. See 1'. WOLFF, IN PURSUIT OF TUNA: THE EXPANSION OF A FISHING INDUSTRY AND
ITS INTERNATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS-THE END OF AN ERA 50 (The Center for Latin
American Studies, Arizona State University, Special Studies No. 19, 1980). The need
for justification of such an assertion led to some innovative legal reasoning. Peru
asserted that international fishing for anchovies off its coast would reduce the fish
population to a level that would also reduce the cormorant population that nested on
its rocky shores. Such overfishing would not only deplete the fishery, but also would
deprive the nation of its guano industry. Id
15. Id. at 47.
16. Id. at 48.
17. 13 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, BULL. No. 327, POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH
RESPECT TO THE NATURAL RESOURCES OF THE SUBSOIL AND SEABED OF THE CONTINENTAL
SHELF 485 (1945).
18. 13 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, BULL. No. 327, POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH
RESPECT TO COASTAL FISHERIES IN CERTAIN AREAS OF THE HIGH SEAS 486 (1945).
This second proclamation provided:
ITihe Government of the United States regards it as proper to establish conserva-
tion zones in those areas of the high seas contiguous to the coasts of the United
States, wherein fishing activities have been or in the future may be developed
and maintained on a substantial scale. Where such activities have been or shall
hereafter be developed and maintained by its nationals alone, the United States
regards it as proper to establish explicitly bounded conservation zones, in which
fishing activities shall be subject to the regulation and control of the United
States. Where such activities have been or shall hereafter be legitimately
developed and maintained jointly by nationals of the United States and nationals
of other States, explicitly bounded conservation zones may be established under
agreements between the United States and such other states ....
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absent agreement with the affected nations. However, the interna-
tional community, especially the Latin and South American coun..
tries, misinterpreted the proclamation to mean that the United
States had actually established such zones." This confusion initiated
a series of responsive actions among other countries that were to
shape the present fishery regime.
Following the Truman Proclamations, Argentina, in October,
1945, claimed sovereignty over the sea above the continental shelf
contiguous with its coast line in response to what it termed as a
United States claim of sovereignty over the "peripheral epicontinen-
tal shelf."2 The United States claimed this interpretation to be a
misrepresentation of the Truman Proclamations and later issued a
statement asserting that Argentina's action was a violation of inter-
national law.2
In June, 1947, Chile claimed national sovereignty over the seas
adjacent to its coast out to 200 nautical miles,22 and by 1954, nations
following the lead of Chile and Argentina in extending their ter-
ritorial seas had seized twenty United States tuna vessels. 2 1
Congress, concerned with the harassment of these vessels and
pressured by domestic fishing interests, enacted the Fishermen's
Protective Act in 1954.2' The Act provided that the Secretary of
State would take immediate steps to aid the crews of vessels seized
by a foreign country on the basis of rights and claims not recognized
by the United States government.2 ' Additionally, the Secretary of
the Treasury was to reimburse vessel owners for fines levied or
payments made to secure the release of the vessel and crew."6 A
later amendment provided for a contractual guarantee to vessel
owners for such reimbursement 2 ' and, importantly, for the curtail-
ment of foreign aid if the seizing country failed to repay the United
States a sum equal to the vessel's claim.28 Other laws also contained
19. T. WOLFF, supra note 14, at 48. See generally F. CHRISTY & A. SCOTT, supra
note 12, at 161.
20. T. WOLFF, supra note 14, at.51.
21. Id. The statement was a press release dated July 2, 1948.
22. Id at 52.
23. Id. at 54.
24. Act of Aug. 27, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-680. 68 Stat. 883 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§
1971, 1972(1), 1972(2)D)(i)-(iii), 1973(a), 1974, 1975(a)(2) & 1976 (1976)).
25. 22 U.S.C. 8 1972 (1976). See note 21, supra. The United States claimed the 200
mile territorial sea to be violative of international law and refused to recognize the
claims.
26. 22 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976).
27. Act of Aug. 12, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-482, 82 Stat. 729 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §




provisions for the curtailment of foreign aid,29 and the United States
government did not hesitate to retaliate as the fishery controversy
grew more heated."9 Functionally then, the FPA preserved, by con-
tinuous protest, the character of these waters as high seas rather
than the territorial seas claimed by the South American countries."
In 1966 the United States established a twelve mile fishery
zone, 2 forerunner of the fishery conservation zone (FCZ) established
by the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976. Notably,
all fishing interests except the California tuna industry sought
passage of the 1966 legislation, largely in response to the presence
of Russian fishermen operating within twelve miles of the United
States coast.3 The west coast interests opposed passage of both the
1966 legislation and the FCMA in 1976, fearing that international
reprisal would deprive them of access to distant-water fisheries. 4
Expressing many of the same objections as the distant-water
fishing interests, the National Security Council Interagency Task
Force on Law of the Sea also opposed passage of the FCMA in 1976.
Speaking for the major governmental departments, the Task Force
29. See Act of Sept. 6, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-171, 79 Stat. 653. § 301(o), providing
for: "consideration [to be] given to excluding from assistance any country which
hereafter seizes, or imposes any penalty or sanction against, any United States vessel
on account of its fishing activities in international waters." See also Act of Oct. 22.
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320, § 3(b), providing:
No defense article or defensive service shall be sold by the United States
government under this Act to any country which ... seizes or takes into custody
or fines an American fishing vessel engaged in fishing more than twelve miles
from the coast of that country.
30. T. WOLFF, supra note 14, at 60. In January of 1971, Ecuador seized a United
States tuna vessel within 200 miles of its coast, and the United States retaliated by
suspending aircraft and ship repair credits to Ecuador for one year. Id.
31. See Meron, The Fishermen's Protective Act: A Case Study in Contemporary
Legal Strategy of the United States, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 290 (1975):
The idea of the U.S. Government's compensating U.S. flag vessels operating off
the coasts of foreign countries arose out of the desire of that government to en-
courage owners of such vessels (and particularly fishing vessels) to continue to
operate in waters considered by the United States to be high seas, but regarded
by the countries concerned (particularly certain Latin American countries) as ter-
ritorial waters of fishery zones. This has brought about the development of govern-
ment programs of compensation and insurance of U.S. fishing vessels for losses to
the fishing industry resulting from seizures, penalties, and confiscations by
coastal states, acts which in the view of the United States amounted to a violation
of international law.
32. Act of Oct. 14, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-658, 80 Stat. 908 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§
1091-1094 (1976)) (repealed by the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331, § 402).
33. H.R. REP. No. 2086, 89th Cong.. 2d Sess. 3 (1966), reprinted in 11966] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3282, 3284.
34. 122 CONG. REC. 443 (1976); 121 CONG. REC. 32538 (1975).
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argued that the best solution was not through passage of such
unilateral legislation, but through a multilateral international agree..
ment such as that then being negotiated in the Third United Nations
Conference on Law of the Sea. 5 The major objections to passage of
the FCMA were that: (1) such unilateral action could seriously
undermine United States efforts in the Law of the Sea negotiations
and hamper any opportunity for multilateral settlement of the fish-
eries question; (2) such unilateral action would be counter to
established fundamental principles of international law and would
encourage similar jurisdictional claims by other countries, thereby
prejudicing United States distant-water fisheries for tuna and
shrimp; (3) serious foreign policy and enforcement problems would
result if other distant-water fishing nations refused to recognize
such unilateral fishing claims; and (4) the bill failed to consider the
"diverse interests of the international community . . .,.
Despite such opposition, the overwhelming majority of testi-
mony favored the legislation, and the final version included many
amendments that were suggested to meet the objections to its
passage." To meet those objections on possible ramifications regard-
ing distant-water fisheries and to preserve the Fishermen's Protec-
tive Act, highly migratory species were exempted from management
jurisdiction. 8 Continued use of the waters off South America by
United States tuna vessels furthered the United States position that
the 200 mile territorial sea was a claim in violation of international
law. 9
Although exempted from the FCMA, the tunas were not wholly
without regulation. In 1949, the United States entered into an agree-
ment with Costa Rica for the establishment of the Inter-American
Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC),'0 later joined by other nations.41
In May 1966, noting that the member nations had a mutual interest
35. H.R. REP. No. 445, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1975), reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 593, 595.
36. lId.
37. Id at 24, 11976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 596.
38. 16 U.S.C. § 1813 (1976).
39. See note 31, aupra.
40. 1 U.S.T. 230, T.I.A.S. No. 2044. See also 16 U.S.C. §§ 951-961 (1950) (amended
1962). The purpose of the Convention was to establish cooperation in the gathering of
information to facilitate maintenance of the yellowfin and skipjack tunas in the eastern
Pacific Ocean, 1 U.S.T., 230, 231.
41. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, Treaties in Force 288 (1981). The present signatories are
the United States, Canada, France, Japan, Nicaragua, and Panama. Id Mexico de-
nounced participation in the IATTC in November, 1977, to be effective November,
1978. See 77 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, BULL. No. 2007, Treaty Information 873 (1977).
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in the population of tunas in the Atlantic Ocean,." the United States
entered into the International Convention for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT)." Preservation of the international agree-
ments was also a consideration in excluding tuna from management
authority."
The Present System: Ramifications
The FCMA specifically provides for the establishment of a
fishery conservation zone (FCZ) contiguous to the territorial sea of
the United States, with the inner boundary of the FCZ being the
seaward boundary of each coastal state, and the outer boundary of
the FCZ being a line drawn such that each point on it is 200 nautical
miles from the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured.'
The United States has exclusive fishery management authority over
all fish within the FCZ," except for highly migratory species."
Highly migratory species are defined as tunas which live, spawn,
and migrate over great distances in the waters of the oceans."
No foreign fishing is allowed within the FCZ for species over
which the United States has exclusive management authority 9 un-
less such foreign fishing is conducted pursuant to an existing inter-
national fishery agreement" or a governing international fishery
agreement,51 and pursuant to a valid applicable permit.52 Even then,
foreign vessels will be allowed to harvest only that portion of a pre-
42. Convention Respecting Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, May 14, 1966, 20
U.S.T. 2887, T.I.A.S. No. 6767.
43. 20 U.S.T. 2887, T.I.A.S. No. 6767. See also 16 U.S.C. §§ 971-971i (1975) (amend-
ed 1976 & 1980). The purpose of the Convention was to establish cooperation in the
management of Atlantic tunas. 20 U.S.T. at 2888. The present signatories are the
United States, Benin, Brazil, Canada, Cuba, Dominican Republic, France, Gabon,
Ghana, Ivory Coast, Japan, Korea, Morocco, Portugal, Senegal, South Africa, Spain,
U.S.S.R., and Venezula. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, Treaties in Force 288 (1981).
44. S, REP. No. 416, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1975), reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON
COMMERCE, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., LEGLISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FISHERY CONSERVATION
AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976, at 679 (1976).
: There are two principal treaties which presently apply to highly migratory
species of fish .... Exclusion of highly migratory species from the jurisdiction of
the United States preserves these treaties.
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (1976).
46. Id. § 1812 (1976).
47. ld. § 1813 (1976).
48. Id. § 1802(14) (1976). See note 1. supra.
49. Id. § 1821(a) (1976).
50. Id. § 1821(a)(1) (1976). See also id. § 1821(b) (1976).
51. Id. § 1821(a)(1) (1976). See also id. § 1821(c) (1976).
52. Id. § 1821(a)(3) (1976).
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determined optimum yield not harvested by United States fisher-
man. 6
The FCMA also provides for the Secretary of Commerce to es-
tablish an observer program,5' with the observer to be stationed
aboard each foreign vessel while that vessel is within the FCZ and
is attempting to take any species of fish that may result in an in-
cidental bycatch of billfish.55 The observers perform scientific and
statistical functions. 6 Their services are paid from fees charged to
those foreign vessels.57 Compliance with the observer program is
mandatory, and failure to so comply may result in sanctions against
the vessel,"
The Act makes violation of any provision unlawful," punishable
by civil penalties"0 or forfeitures."1 Primary enforcement responsibility
lies with the Coast Guard,8" and authorized officers may perform
53. Id. § 1821(c)(3) (1976) provides:
The foreign nation ... shall not, in any year harvest an amount of fish which
exceeds such nation's allocation of the total allowable level of foreign fishing
["TALFF"] as determined under subsection (e) of this section.
§ 1821(d) (1976) provides:
The total allowable level of foreign fishing, if any ...shall be that portion of
the optimum yield of such fishery which will not be harvested by vessels of the
United States ....
§ 1821(e) (1976) provides:
(1) The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Secretary, shall determine
the allocation among foreign nations of the total allowable level of foreign fishing
which is permitted with respect to any fishery subject to the exclusive fishery
management authority of the United States. In making such determination, the
Secretary of State and the Secretary shall consider-
(A) whether, and to what extent, the fishing vessels of such nations have tradi-
tionally engaged in fishing in such fishery;
(B) whether such nations have cooperated with the United States in, and made
substantial contributions to, fishery research and the identification of fishery
resources;
(C) whether such nations have cooperated with the United States in enforcement
and with respect to the conservation and management of fishery resources:
and
(D) such other matters as the Secretary of State, in cooperation with the
Secretary, deems appropriate.
54. Id. § 1827 (1976), as amended by Act of Sept. 4, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-339, 94
Stat. 1069, § 2. See also Act of Dec. 22, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-561, 94 Stat. 3275, § 236,
providing that the observer requirement may be waived under certain circumstances.
55. 16 U.S.C. § 1827(b) (1980).
56. Id. § 1827(c) (1980).
57. Id. § 1827(d) (1980).
58. Jd § 1827(f) (1980).
59. Id. § 1857 (1976).
60. Id. § 1858 (1976).
61. Id. § 1860 (1976).
62. Id. § 1861 (1976),
[Vol. 42
COMMENT
warrantless searches of vessels for purposes of enforcing the
FCMA. °3
Although the United States has no authority under the FCMA
to manage directly the harvest of tunas by foreign vessels within
the FCZ, the United States does have authority to regulate the
bycatch of these vessels under certain circumstances." Management
measures affecting foreign longliners fishing for tuna in the FCZ are
permissible if the measures allow a reasonable opportunity to fish
for tuna, and the measures impose the least restrictive burden on
such vessels necessary for proper conservation and management of
the bycatch.6 5 To withstand judicial scrutiny, any management plan
implementing such measures should contain an evaluation of the
following: (1) the purpose of each management measure, (2) the need
for the measure, (3) the expected effect of the measure, (4) the fac-
tual basis for the expectation that the measure will achieve its in-
tended purpose, and (5) any alternative methods of achieving the
same objective, with an explanation of why the proposed measure
would be preferable to any alternatives."'
Since March, 1978, the bycatch of billfishes by the Japanese
longline fleet has been regulated by a Preliminary Management Plan
for billfishes and sharks promulgated by the Secretary of Com-
merce." This plan will govern the activities of foreign longliners un-
til a final Fishery Management Plan is approved.
Pertinent management regulations for the billfishes require that
all billfish must be released with a minimum of injury, regardless of
the condition of the fish. 9 Release must be effected by cutting the
line or by other appropriate means without removing the fish from
the water."0 Foreign vessels are required to submit quarterly
reports on the number of hooks set, the number of billfishes caught
and released, and the number that were released alive.7'
63. Id § 1861(b)(1) (1976). See also United States v. Tsuda Maru, 470 F. Supp. 1223
(D.C. Alaska 1979).
64. Letter from Richard A. Frank of the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration to Congressman John Breaux (D. La), Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment, House Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries (Oct. 15, 1979), apprising Mr. Breaux of the legal opin-
ion of N.O.A.A. counsel concerning measures which affect foreign longlining for tuna in
the FCZ [hereinafter cited as the Frank letter].
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(h) (1976) (as amended 1978). See 50 C.F.R. § 611.60 (1980).
68. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(h) (1976) (as amended 1978). See 50 C.F.R. § 611.60 (1980).
69. 50 C.F.R. § 611.60(c)(2)(i) (1980).
70. Id. § 611.60(c)(2)(ii) (1980).
71. Id. § 611.60(g) (1980).
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Applying the two-pronged test to these measures, the re-
quirements allow a reasonable opportunity to fish for tuna, and the
release, reporting, and statistical measures impose the least restric-
tive burden on the longline fishermen necessary to achieve conser-
vation and proper management of the billfish stock.
Despite the safeguards against billfish bycatch and destruction,
statistical data provided by the National Marine Fisheries Service
illustrates why the mere presence of longliners in the Gulf of Mex-
ico provokes such heated controversy. Although all billfishes are
released, the mortality rate in the Gulf runs in excess of 70
percent." In 1979, data shows that 8,000 tuna and 2,000 billfish were
hooked in the Gulf, 3 with all tuna being kept, and the mortality rate
among the billfish released at 70 percent.74 In 1980, 22,000 tuna and
7,000 billfish were hooked. 5 Seven thousand of the tuna kept by the
Japanese were bluefin tuna, 7 and the mortality rate among the re-
leased billfish was 78 percent. 77 In 1981, another 20,000 tuna and
4,000 billfish were hooked, 7 again with 7,000 of the tuna kept being
bluefins, and the billfish mortality rate at 73 percent. 7 The statistics
on billfish mortality demonstrate the heavy destruction in the
billfishery, even then only as an incidental bycatch.
Even more striking, however, is the plight of the giant bluefin
tuna. The bluefins enter the Gulf of Mexico each spring to spawn
somewhere along the loop that carries them from the Caribbean,
past the Mississippi delta, and out into the Gulf Stream through the
Straits of Florida." While at one time the giant bluefins may have
numbered in the millions, some estimates put the present stock at
100,000. Each spawn produces a new class of bluefins, and the
giants are the survivors of classes spawned 20 to 30 years ago. 2
72. Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council, Fishery Management Plan for
Atlantic Bilifishes: White Marlin, Blue Marlin, Sailfish, and Spearfish, Public Hearing
Summary, at 2 (1981) [hereinafter cited as FMP for Atlantic Billfishes]. Note that the
60 percent figure was for the entire Atlantic Fishery. Statistical data from the Na-
tional Marine Fisheries Service shows the mortality rate in the Gulf of Mexico to be
more than 10 percent higher. See notes 73-79, infra.
73. Southeast Fisheries Center, National Marine Fisheries Service, Southeast
Observer News 3:1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Southeast Observer News].
74. Id.
75. Id. at 4:1 (1981).
76. Id.
77. Id
78. Id. at 4:6 (1981).
79. Id.





With today's efficient catch methods," a class of small or medium-
sized tuna virtually can be fished out of existence, leaving no
member of the class to reach spawning age." Such practices result
in classes of very large old fish and classes of very young small
fish. 5 Due to the lack of an effective regulatory authority, interna-
tional or domestic, the giant bluefin tuna just may be the American
bison of the oceans.
Though not regulated under the FCMA, the taking of tunas in
the Atlantic Ocean is regulated under the Atlantic Tunas Conven-
tion Act of 1975 (ATCA),8 the implementing legislation for the Inter-
national Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT).
The regulations provide that 650 tons of school bluefin tuna may be
taken in the regulated area by purse seiners." The purse seine
quota for giant bluefins is 300 tons," and the giant bluefin quota for
fishermen other than purse seiners is 1,218 tons or 3,370 fish."
Notably, the Gulf of Mexico is not within the area regulated under
ICCAT." If the Gulf were included, bluefins could be better pro-
tected while on their spawning grounds through the imposition of
quotas like those applied in the Atlantic, rather than by reliance on
voluntary restrictions presently agreed to by the Japanese.
In view of the problems created in the tuna and billfisheries by
the presence of longliners in the Gulf of Mexico, the Japanese have
been cooperative in attempts to work within the present system to
achieve some sort of acceptable compromise. In 1976, the Japanese
voluntarily agreed to limit their take of bluefin tuna in the Gulf to
10,000 fish." By 1978, this limit was scaled down to 8,000 bluefins,
also the agreed take for 1979.2 In 1980 and 1981, the agreed take
was reduced to 7,000 fish, and the Japanese further agreed to
operate no more than twenty-four ships in the Gulf at any one
time. 3 Additionally, all ships were to leave the Gulf by May 16,
83. See generally A. FRIDMAN, supra note 3.
84. Weld, supra note 5, at 72.
85. Id. at 71. In an interview with Maumus Claverie. Jr.. member of the New
Orleans Big Game Fishing Club, in New Orleans, La. (June 2, 1981), Mr. Claverie
remarked, "You've got grade school and college, but not much else in between."
86. 16 U.S.C. § 971-971i (1975) (amended 1976 & 1980).
87. 50 C.F.R. § 285.30(a)(1) (1980).
88. Id. § 285.30(a)(2) (1980).
89. Id. § 285.30(b) (1980).
90. Id. § 285.9 (1980).
91. Interview with Corky Perrett, member of the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Manage-
ment Council, in Lafayette, La. (June 10, 1981).
92. Id,
93. NAUTILUS, 7 MARINE FISH MANAGEMENT No. 6 at 4 (1981).
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1981," and longlines were not to be set in areas known to have high
concentrations of billfish."5 The bluefin count would not include fish
damaged by sharks."' Importantly, these agreements were not
government-to-government, but were instead voluntary compacts
between the Japanese fishing industry and American fishing in-
terests, negotiated through the United States State Department."
The Future System: Solutions
If the fishery management system in operation today remains
unchanged, approval of a Fishery Management Plan to replace the
current Preliminary Management Plan might result in tighter re-
strictions on longliners operating in the Gulf of Mexico through im-
position of management measures similar to those already agreed to
by the Japanese. A Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Billfishes
(FMP) has been proposed which, if adopted, would apply to the
Gulf." Prepared by all Fishery Management Councils with interests
in the Atlantic fishery," the FMP requires the final approval of the
Secretary of Commerce.' 0
The proposed FMP would implement the following management
measures in the Gulf: (1) permits would be required of all foreign
vessels in the FCZ employing gear capable of taking billfish; (2) all
such foreign vessels would be required to carry and operate
position-fixing transponders; (3) certain areas of the FCZ would be
closed to foreign fishing during periods when the bycatch is likely to
be significant or when. such fishing would conflict with domestic
operations; (4) the number of foreign longliners in the FCZ never
could exceed twenty-four at any one time; and (5) all longliners must
depart by May 16 of each year."'
94. VOLUNTARY MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN 1981 BY JAPAN'S TUNA FISHERMEN IN THE
U.S. FCZ IN THE ATLANTIC AND GULF OF MEXICO (Draft), prepared by Ambassador Mor-
ris D. Busby, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs, Depart-
ment of State, at 1. See also Southeast Observer News, supra note 73, at 4:6 (1981).
All Japanese longliners had departed from the Gulf by May 6, 1981, despite the May
16 deadline.
95. Draft, supra note 94, at 3.
96. Letter from Theodore J. Kronmiller, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Oceans and Fisheries Affairs, Department of State, to the Gulf of Mexico Regional
Fishery Management Council (June 11, 1981), apprising the Council of the status of the
negotiations with the Japanese, in which Mr. Kronmiller noted that the Japanese
might be willing to include shark-damaged bluefins in their count for 1982, thereby
reducing the overall take [hereinafter cited as the Kronmiller letterl.
97. Id
98. FMP for Atlantic Billfishes, supra note 72.
99. Id at 1. The councils involved are the New England, Mid-Atlantic, South
Atlantic, Gulf of Mexico, and Caribbean. Id.
100. 16 U.S.C. § 1854 (1976).
101. FMP for Atlantic Billfishes, supra note 72, at 4-5.
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The maximum sustainable yield (MSY) of a fishery resource is
the largest quantity of fish that can be harvested annually from the
resource without reducing its long-term productive potential.10 2 Ad-
ditionally, the FMP estimates the MSY for white and blue marlin to
be 88,100 and 25,000 fish respectively, and the MSY for sailfishes
and spearfishes combined to be 115,400 fish.' 3
A key component of any FMP is the optimum yield (OY), the
quantity of fish that will provide the greatest overall benefit to the
United States with regard to food and recreational opportunity."'
Not only is MSY considered in determining optimum yield, but the
economic, social, and ecological values of the fishery to its user
groups are also considered.' 0 The proposed FMP calculates the OY
for blue marlin to be 5,665 fish, with white marlin at 13,929 and
sailfishes and spearfishes at 59,545.I11
The current take of white and blue marlin, exceeding the
calculated OY for both species by 20 percent,' indicates the need
for immediate action to conserve the fishery. Under the FCMA, the
foreign fishermen in the FCZ fishing for species over which the
United States has management authority are allowed to harvest only
that portion of the OY not harvested by United States fishermen.' 0
Under the proposed FMP, domestic fishermen are expected to
harvest the entire OY for billfishes: therefore, no billfish could be
taken by foreign longliners. °0 However, due to the inevitable
bycatch of billfishes, the proposed plan would allocate 2 percent of
the OY to the longline fishermen."' But because none may be kept, "'
this 2 percent allocation actually limits the number of billfish to
those that may be hooked."' The net effect of this provision would
be to force termination of longlining altogether once 2 percent of the
OY for billfishes has been hooked, an effect of obvious benefit to the
bluefin tuna stock. Alternatively, the Japanese would be forced to
102. J. GULLAND, THE MANAGEMENT OF MARINE FISHERIES 107 (1974). See also OP.
TIMUM SUSTAINABLE YIELD AS A CONCEPT IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 5 (P. Roedel ed.
1975).
103. FMP for Atlantic Billfishes, supra note 72, at 2. The MSY for sailfishes and
spearfishes was based on the entire Atlantic fishery, while MSY for white and blue
marlin was for the north Atlantic only (including the Gulf of Mexico). Id. at 2.
104. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(18)(A) (1976).
105. Id. § 1802(18)(B) (1976.
106. FMP for Atlantic Billfishes, supra note 72, at 2.
107. Id.
108. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(3) (1976) (amended 1978). See note 53, supra.
109. FMP for Atlantic Billfishes, supra note 73, at 3.
110. 1d. at 4.
111. Id. This allocation is not actually a "TALFF" (see note 53, supra) because none
of the fish may be retained.
112. Id.
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develop a new technology for taking tuna without the bycatch of
billfish.
Tuna fishing, even within the FCZ, is a recognized legitimate
use of the high sea:i, and Congress intended incidental regulation only
when necessary."3 Some of the proposed measures do more than in-
cidentally regulate, and application of the two-pronged test shows
several of the regulations to be of doubtful legality.1"' For example,
the time and area restrictions"5 and the measures forcing terminar
tion of longlining alitogether once 2 percent of the OY has been hooked
are of questionable legality.
Closure of the Gulf FCZ to tuna longlining from May 16 to Oc-
tober 31 as proposed in the FMP is such a sweeping measure that it
fails to provide a :reasonable opportunity to fish for tuna and is not
the least restrictive measure consonant with proper conservation
and management of the fishery."' Forced termination of longlining
once 2 percent of the OY for billfishes has been hooked does not pro-
vide a reasonable opportunity to fish for tuna, especially in light of
the extensive inevitable bycatch, nor would it be the least restric-
tive alternative available for proper management of the billfishery.
On the other hand, the proposed requirements that foreign
vessels seeking tuna within the FCZ be required to obtain permits
and carry position-fixing transponders allow a reasonable opportunity
to fish for tuna and impose the least restrictive burden on such
vessels that will achieve conservation and proper management of
the billfish stock. Also, while limitation of the vessels in the FCZ at
any one time to twenty-four is an apparent restriction of the oppor-
tunity to fish for tuna, twenty-four vessels arguably may provide a
reasonable opportunity and might be the least restrictive alter-
native consonant with sound management of the billfishery.
Management measures affecting the tuna longline industry, to
be within permissible bounds, should be brought to bear only when
their application will provide a demonstrable net benefit based on
113. Frank letter, eupra note 64.
114. Letter from James A. Storer, Director, Office of Fisheries Affairs, Bureau of
Oceans and International, Environmental, and Scientific Affairs. Department of State,
to Benjamin Hardesty, Chairman, South Atlantic Fishery Management Council (Mar.
31, 1980), apprising Mr. Hardesty of the view of the State Department on the legality
of certain measures in the proposed FMP for Atlantic Billfishes Ihereinafter cited as
the Storer letter].
115. Id. The same view was expressed in a letter from Craig O'Connor, General
Counsel, Southeast, N.O.A.A., to Mr. Hardesty (Jan. 1. 1980).
116. Storer letter, supra note 114.
[Vol. 42
COMMENT
an analysis of social, economic, and ecological factors."' Regulation
of the longline fishery may result in some measurable improvement
in the availability of the billfish stock to recreational fishermen,
especially in relation to catch-per-unit effort,"8 or in relation to some
social or economic benefit attendant to that improvement."'9
However, "increased availability" is not a type of management ob-
jective closely related to some biological need for conservation of
the billfish stock,'" and management measures should be supported
by data demonstrating biological restoration and maintenance of the
fishery.'2' If supported by such data, the proposed provisions on per-
mits, position-fixing equipment, and restrictions on the number of
vessels in the Gulf FCZ probably would satisfy the two-pronged
test. Time and area restrictions and the 2 percent OY allocation for
billfishes as written would probably fail to do so.
The Japanese already have complied voluntarily with virtually
all of the management measures proposed by the FMP with the ex-
ception of the 2 percent allocation of optimum yield. Recently,
representatives of the United States and Japan discussed the tuna
longline activities in the FCZ.'22 Each of the affected Fishery
Management Councils was represented. The United States delega-
tion sought the following voluntary measures on the part of the
Japanese in 1982: (1) to reduce the take of bluefin tuna in the Gulf of
Mexico from 7,000 to 5,000 fish, (2) to change the method of counting
bluefins to include those fish damaged by sharks, (3) to cease longlin-
ing operations once a pre-determined quota of billfish has been hooked,
(4) to reduce the number of operating vessels below the current
level of twenty-four, and (5) to cease operations in the Gulf by May 1
rather than May 16.23 Similar concessions were sought for the
Atlantic FCZ.'2 ' No action was taken other than discussion of the
proposals, but the parties agreed to meet again by August 1981.125
As of this writing no accord has been reached.
117. Letter from Terry L. Leitzeli, Assistant Administrator for Fisheries, National
Marine Fisheries Service, to Robert Jones, Chairman, Gulf of Mexico Fishery Manage-
ment Council (Dec. 13, 1979), apprising Mr. Jones of the position of N.M.F.S. on certain
measures in the proposed FMP having an effect on tuna longlining.
118. Legal memorandum from Jay S. Johnson, General Counsel for Fisheries,
N.O.A.A., to Eldon Greenburg, General Counsel, N.O.A.A., analyzing the legality of
billfish conservation measures having an effect on tuna longlining, at 8 [hereinafter
cited as the Johnson memorandum].
119. Id.
120. Storer letter, supra note 114.
121. Johnson memorandum, supra note 118.
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If the present fishery management system was altered by
amendment of the FCMA to bring highly migratory species under
management authority of the United States, some problems would
be solved, but others would be created. On the positive side, the
Gulf tuna fishery could be managed to ensure the survival of the
giant bluefin tuna. Stringent quotas on Gulf tuna stocks might cause
the Japanese to abandon the fishery altogether, leaving both the
tuna and billfisheries free for domestic exploitation, subject to sound
management prac;ices. Exclusive management authority over tuna
would allow direct regulation of the foreign longlining activities
through such measures as time and area restrictions and forced
termination of activity once the billfish quota has been hooked,
which otherwise might be an unreasonable impingement upon
freedom of the high seas.
Several groups have advocated amendment of the FCMA and
the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act of 1975 (ATCA) to bring all
species under the management authority of the United States."'6
Amendment of the FCMA would simply require deletion of 16 U.S.C.
§ 1813 (1976), the highly migratory exception, and the proposed
amendment of ATCA would provide, among other changes, that
tunas be managed under ICCAT pursuant to Fishery Management
Plans developed by the Regional Councils. 2 '
The American Tuna Action Committee (ATAC) has argued that
the tunas are subjected to an extensive, unregulated fishery that
operates contrary to the spirit of the FCMA and to the detriment of
domestic fishermen, both commercial and recreational.'28 ATAC has
asserted that the entire system has caused considerable damage to
the economic well-being of coastal communities.' 9 Available statistical
data indicates that both fisheries face irreparable damage unless
some sort of action is taken soon.
On the negative side, amendment of the existing fishery
management system carries with it certain adverse ramifications.
Distant-water fishing interests have opposed vociferously United
States expansion of its fishery management authority, fearing inter-
national reprisals that would cost them access to distant-water
126. NAUTILUS, 7 MARINE FISH MANAGEMENT No. 4 at 1 (1981). The American Tuna
Action Committee (ATAC) is actively seeking amendment of the FCMA and the Atlan-
tic Tunas Convention Act of 1975. The New Orleans Big Game Fishing Club, through
Maumus Claverie, Jr., has also advocated amendment of the FCMA.
127. Draft amendment of the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act of 1975 prepared by
A.T.A.C. and graciously provided by Arnet Taylor, Executive Director.
128. A.T.A.C. memorandum prepared in support of the proposed amendments, at 8.
129. Id. at 9.
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fisheries."8 For example, amendment of the FCMA to include tuna
would mean that the Fishermen's Protective Act no longer would
protect United States tuna vessels venturing within 200 miles of
certain portions of South America, for our inclusion of highly
migratory species would be tantamount to a recognition that the 200
mile fishing zone including tuna is a claim valid under international
law, reversing twenty-five years of United States foreign policy. '
By continuous protest through continued use, vessels fishing in
these waters under the protection of the FPA preserved the
character of these waters as high seas." The United States State
Department views amendment of the FCMA or direct regulation of
the tuna longliners while within our 200 mile FCZ as dangerous
precedent to other nations wishing to impose restrictions on tuna
fishing not directly related to conservation of the stock, and such
measures would represent significant problems in negotiating a solu-
tion on behalf of the United States distant-water fishermen.'33
Conclusion
Based on available statistical data, immediate regulation of the
tuna and billfish stocks is necessary to conserve the fisheries."3 ' The
most effective means of achieving the necessary regulatory authority
would be by amendment of the FCMA to extend United States
management authority to highly migratory species. The Gulf of Mex-
ico tuna stock finally would be subject to uniform management,
perhaps not too late to save the giant bluefin tuna. Because the tuna
longliners could then be regulated directly, placing stringent
measures on foreign billfish bycatch would help ease the destruction
prevalent in the fishery. If the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act were
amended as proposed, Fishery Management Plans developed by the
Regional Councils would ensure uniform management of the tuna
fishery through ICCAT. To achieve true uniformity, the Gulf of
Mexico should be brought within the ICCAT regulated area.
However, the negative effect of such amendments would amount
to a recognition of the right of South American countries to manage
highly migratory species, and the Fishermen's Protective Act would
no longer protect United States tuna vessels venturing within 200
miles of these nations.'33 Continued use of these waters by United
130. See note 34, supra.
131. See note 31, supra.
132. Id.
133. Storer letter, supra note 114.
134. See notes 74-87, supra.
135. See note 31, supra.
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States vessels had furthered the United States claim that these
were high seas and that the claim to a 200 mile territorial sea was a
violation of international law.'" A United States claim of manage-
ment authority over tuna would represent a significant barrier in
negotiations on behalf of United States distant-water fishing in-
terests.3 1
Without amendment of the FCMA, the Gulf tuna stock, excluded
from ICCAT, may be managed only through voluntary conservation
measures on the part of the Japanese. Billfishes are currently
managed pursuan; to the Preliminary Management Plan pending ap-
proval of the final Fishery Management Plan, but the proposed FMP
would seek to impose regulations that are of doubtful legality. Ap-
proval of the FMP would make mandatory certain management
measures such as time and area restrictions and forced termination,
which do not allow a reasonable opportunity to fish for tuna and
hence are probably illegal under international law," while the
Japanese already have agreed voluntarily to most of the measures.
Additionally, the State Department believes such sweeping mea-
sures constitute direct regulation of tuna fishing and could be
dangerous precedent to other nations wishing to impose restrictions
on tuna fishing off their coasts, and, like amendment of the FCMA
to include highly migratory species, would represent a major
obstacle in negotiations with these nations on behalf of United
States distant-water fishing interests."'
On balance, amendment of the FCMA to extend the United
States management authority to highly migratory species would
provide distinct advantages over retention of the tuna exception
with approval of an FMP for billfishes, while the negative effect of
either alternative likely would be the same. Amendment of the
FCMA would allow direct regulation of the tuna fishery and strin-
gent measures to prevent billfish destruction, while retention of the
exception would mean maintenance of the status quo, for the most
stringent of the proposed management measures in the FMP are of
doubtful legality.""
The optimum solution, then, would require amendment of the
Fishery ConservaLion and Management Act of 1976 to bring highly
migratory species-e.g., tuna-under the exclusive management
authority of the United States. The Atlantic Tunas Convention Act
136. Id






of 1975 should be amended to allow regulation of Atlantic tunas
under ICCAT pursuant to Fishery Management Plans developed by
the Regional Councils, and the Gulf of Mexico should be brought
within the regulated area. To avoid the sudden economic dislocation
of the parties involved, a reasonable delay should be provided
before such an amendment would become effective. In the interim,
United States distant-water fishing interests could engage in the
negotiations necessary to provide them with access to the fisheries.
The United States State Department should push for more stringent
voluntary conservation measures on the part of the Japanese
longline industry, particularly those measures dealing with the
method of counting bluefin tuna.
Commercial and sport fishing interests constitute a major source
of income to the nation," ' particularly along the Gulf Coast. Interna-
tional fishery agreements have not been effective in preventing
overfishing of the tuna and billfish resources; unless immediate ac-
tion is taken, irreversible damage could be done." ' In this spirit the
FCMA was adopted. Sound policy dictates that the tunas and
billfishes be managed according to the same guidelines.
Douglas F. Pedigo*
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